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The Supreme Beef Case: An Opportunity to
Rethink Federal Food Safety Regulation
By Blake B. Johnson*

I. Introduction
The food supply in America is among the safest in the world.'
The horrific meat packing plant conditions depicted in Upton
Sinclair's The Jungle are a thing of the past. However, while
conditions in meat packing plants are certainly better than they were
a hundred years ago, they still may not be as sanitary as necessary to
protect consumers' health. Millions of consumers become sick,2 and
thousands die every year because of food-borne pathogens. 3
For nearly a century meat produced in the United States has
been subject to government regulation under the Pure Food and Drug
Act of 1906 ("PFDA") 4 and the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1907
("FMIA"). 5 Over the past hundred years these regulations have
* J.D. candidate, May 2005, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.
Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The author would
like to thank his family for their love and support.
' Rob Longley, New farm bill, deal with Russians could help farmers, DAILY
NEWs LEADER, Oct. 14, 2003, at 3A (quoting Undersecretary for Food Safety Elsa
Murano, who noted that the United States has the lowest incidence of food-borne
illness in the world), available at 2003 WL 6723378. See also Richard A. Merrill &
Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L.
REv. 61, 68 (2000); Joanne Bowlby, Numerous Factors Can Contribute to Foodborne Illness, WYOMING TRIBUNE-EAGLE, Dec. 3, 2000, at A 10.
2 Beefing up food safety: Lawsuits underscore a report'scallfor new, sciencebased standards,OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 10, 2003, at 6B, available at 2003
WL 5276273 [hereinafter Beefing up food safety].
3 Merrill & Francer, supra note 1, at 68.
4 Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) repealed
by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 392(a)).
5 Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-80 (1907), amended by Act
of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907).
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undergone a series of advancements designed to protect consumers,
while at the same time recognizing meat Producers' interest in
keeping their products both cheap and popular. Recently, in response
to outbreaks of pathogens like E. coli and Salmonella, the United
States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") has developed new and
innovative ways to enforce food safety standards.7
From 1998 to 2000, the USDA's inspection division, the Food
Safety and Inspection Service ("FSIS"), phased in a system known as
the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point program
to
("HACCP"). This program allows the meat packing industry
9
develop safety guidelines that are overseen by the government.
The first serious test of this new type of regulation in the meat
packing industry came in Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. United
States Departmentof Agriculture. 0 In Supreme Beef the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the USDA overstepped its congressional
mandate in enforcing the HACCP in a Supreme Beef meat packing
plant. "
This article will give a short history of government
regulations in the meat packing industry, and the government's
efforts to streamline such regulations. It will then discuss the current
HACCP program. Next, the article will analyze Supreme Beef and its
potential effect on the federal government's ability to monitor and
regulate food safety. Finally, it will address what effect, if any,
Supreme Beef will have on the consumer.
Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat.
441 (1957) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-69). See also Douglas C.
Michael, Cooperative Implementation of FederalRegulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG.
535, 572 (1996).
7 See, e.g., USDA Hazard Analysis and HACCP Plan, 9 C.F.R. § 417.2
(2003). See generally Merrill & Francer, supra note 1, at 61. See also Caroline
Smith DeWaal, Delivering on HACCP's Promise to Improve Food Safety: A
Comparison of Three HA CCP Regulations, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 331, 331 (1997).
6 See

8

USDA Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 9

C.F.R. § 417.1 (2003); Lawrence J. Dyckman, Better USDA Oversight and
Enforcement of Safety Rules Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses,
General Accounting Office Reports, Report No. GAO-02-902 (Aug. 30, 2002). See
also Melody Peterson & Christopher Drew, The Slaughterhouse Gamble: The Risk
of Self-Policing; New Safety Rules Fail to Stop Tainted Meat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2003, at Al.
9 9 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2003). See also DeWaal, supra note 7, at 333.
10 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Supreme Beef II].
"

Id. at 443.
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II. Background
A. Government Food Safety Regulation
The USDA was established in 1862 with one primary
mission: to promote American agriculture. 12 Forty years later, when
public concern about food safety grew strong enough to compel
government intervention, the USDA was the logical choice, even
though its charter said nothing about food safety. 13 At the heart of
this logic was a glaring conflict: how could an agency both promote
American agriculture while fulfilling
its duty to monitor and dispose
14
of tainted agricultural products?
In 1906 and 1907, in response to public pressure, Congress
adopted the PFDA 15 and the FMIA. 16 This legislation made it a crime
to introduce adulterated food into the stream of commerce and gave
the federal government authority to examine food through federal
inspectors, who would continually examine meat products.' 7 These
acts represented the first time the federal government successfully
passed legislation prohibiting adulterated food in interstate
commerce. 8
Throughout the twentieth century government policy adapted
to meet the needs of a changing country. Responsibility for the
regulation of food shifted between departments. 19 In 1940,
responding to what some perceived as a conflict between the mission
of the USDA and its food safety goals, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt removed the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), an

12

Merrill & Francer, supra note 1, at 78.

13

Id.

14 Id.

Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) repealed
by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 392(a)). See also Merrill & Francer,
supra note 1, at 79.
16 Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-80 (1907), amended by Act
15

of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 601-80). See also Merrill & Francer, supra note 1, at 79.
17 Merrill & Francer, supra note 1, at 79 (citing the PFDA).
18 Id.
19

Id.

at 82.
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agency responsible for regulation of non-meat products, from the
USDA. 2 This measure left the USDA with only the power to
regulate meat and poultry. 21 The division of food safety duties grew
in 1970 when President Richard M. Nixon delegated pesticide
regulation to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
requiring the EPA to oversee governmental pesticide tolerances on
food.22
While federal food safety laws form the basis of the
government's authority to regulate the meat packing industry, they
have not been amended in 22 years.23 Worse, there has not been a
major overhaul to the federal laws governing the industry since
1967.24 The last major change to the federal meat inspection code
came when contemporary science had no knowledge of two major
food-borne pathogens: Listeria and E. coli. 25 This 1967 overhaul, in
what became the Wholesome Meat Act,26 did not even include
among its goals the reduction of illness caused by tainted meat.27 In
fact, the USDA does
28 not even have the authority to order a recall of
contaminated meat.
B. The Evolution of USDA Food Safety Regulations
29
Today, the FSIS provides federal oversight of meat safety.
The FSIS continuously inspects every factory that processes meat or
poultry bound for interstate distribution. 30 Federal law requires the
FSIS to physically inspect each animal slaughtered in a meat packing

20

Merrill & Francer, supra note 1, at 82-83.

21

Id. at 84.

22

Id. at 85.

23

See

Aparna

Surendran,

Meat Inspection Suffers

Government at Odds, PHILADELPHIA

INQUIRER,

Because Industry,

June 5, 2003.

24 Id.

5 id.

26 Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 585 (1967).
27 See Surendran, supra note 23.
28 See Peterson & Drew, supra note 8, at Al.
29 See USDA Administrator, Food Safety and Inspection Service, 7 C.F.R. §
2.53 (1998); Merrill & Francer, supra note 1, at 99 (outlining the work of the
FSIS).
30 See id.
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plant.3 '
The FSIS has implemented a variety of different programs
32
designed to prevent unsanitary food from entering the marketplace.
In 1980, for example, the FSIS adopted a cooperative food safety
implementation program. 33 Known as a "total plant quality control
system,"34 the program allowed meat packing plants to design their
own food safety system, which was then presented to the FSIS for
approval.35 Following such approval, the FSIS allowed a plant to
label its products as safe and was sometimes entitled to process
certain products absent a federal inspector. 36 Some have criticized
this program as a limited success, because of limited savings to
meatpackers and because the program was not a significant deviation
from the normal regulations. However, the program did show that
the USDA was willing to transfer some of its food safety authority to
the industry that it oversaw.
Following the Processed Products Inspection Act of 1986,38
Congress allowed the FSIS to shift federal inspectors away from
plants with demonstrated records of compliance with food safety
regulations and into plants with more questionable histories. 39 These
actions were met with concern from consumer groups, the
meatpacking industry, and even FSIS employees.40 Faced with such a
backlash, Congress did not renew the program's statutory authority
after it lapsed in November 1992. 4'

31 Michael, supra note 6, at 563.
32

Id. at 561.

33 Voluntary Meat and Poultry Plant Quality Control Systems, 45 Fed. Reg.

54,310 (Aug. 15, 1980) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 318 and 381); see also Michael,
supra note 6, at 566.
34 See id.
35id.

Voluntary Meat and Poultry Plant Quality Control Systems, 45 Fed. Reg. at
54,310; see also Michael, supra note 6, at 566-67.
31Michael, supra note 6, at 568.
38 Processed Products Inspection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, § 403(a),
36

100 Stat. 3567 (1986).
39Michael, supra note 6, at 565.
4 Id.
41

Processed Products Inspection Act of 1986 § 403(a); see also Michael,

supra note 6, at 566.
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In 1988 the FSIS proposed a "Streamlined Inspection System"
which delegated some federal inspection authority to plant

("SIS",),42

employees while keeping inspectors in the plants.4 3 The FSIS'
overarching goal in proposing the SIS was to increase plant
productivity but maintain quality.44 Unfortunately, reports indicated
that the industry was thwarting the system,45 and despite the best
efforts of the USDA, consumer and industry groups also opposed
this
47
program. 46 Congress eventually cancelled funding for the SiS.
C. FSIS Implementation of the HACCP
Given the limited success of these programs, the FSIS

proposed the HACCP for the meat and poultry industries. 4 8 On July
25, 1996 the FSIS issued a final rule pursuant to its power under the

FMIA, 49 requiring all meat processors to develop and implement their
own protocols to ensure the safety of their products. 50 The HACCP
program followed widespread publicity of an E. coli outbreak in
1993, during which three children died and more than 450 people
51
were sickened by hamburgers from Jack-in-the-Box restaurants.
Streamlined Inspection System, 53 Fed. Reg. 48,262 (Nov. 30, 1998);
Michael, supra note 6, at 563.
43 Streamlined Inspection System, 53 Fed. Reg. at 48,264-65; Michael, supra
note 6, at 563.
44 id.
45 See Jack Anderson, Meat Inspection By New System May Miss Dirt,
NEWSDAY, May 5, 1988, at 100 (describing an incident where a meatpacking plant
was able to isolate and specially clean a batch of cattle tongues that was set for
inspection), availableat 1988 WL 2950233.
46 See Arthur S. Brisbane, Health, Safety Charges Put Poultry Industry Under
Broiler,WASH. POST, July 26, 1989, at A2 (describing a news conference featuring
consumer groups attacking the SIS for causing a sharp increase in Salmonella
contamination), available at 1989 WL 2042415. See also Michael, supra note 6, at
563.
42

47 Michael, supra note 6, at 563.
48 DeWaal, supra note 7, at 331.
49 Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-80 (2003).
50 USDA Hazard Analysis and HACCP Plan, 9 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2003). See
also Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1049 (N.D.
Tex. 2000), affid, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Supreme Beefl].
5 Nigol Manoukian, Note, The Federal Government's Inspection and
Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products: Is It Sufficient to Protect the Public's
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The HACCP is basically a two step process: first, the plant
identifies the "critical points" where food-borne pathogens are most
likely to be introduced into meat. 52 Second, it establishes safety
standards for those points. 53 It has been suggested that this system is
Indeed, conventional
intrinsically better than its predecessors.
inspection does not always identify products that are tainted because
random sampling will not always detect a problem and dangerous
pathogens can exist in small quantities that are difficult to find.55
HACCP shifts the focus to the process of production and
56 allows for
areas.
problem
manufacturer's
each
to
tailored
solutions
The tailored solutions that the HACCP provides are only
made possible because the government is able to ensure that they are
appropriately implemented.f 7 Once a HACCP program is in place at a
meatpacking facility, it 58is essential that a process known as
"verification" take place. The verification process involves the
government's use of studies and testing to determine whether the
controls put in place at a plant are actually working. 59 Without
verification, "controls may be instituted that do not have the desired
effect of either eliminating or reducing the hazard, or 60alternatively, no
controls are instituted where they are in fact needed.",
D. Construction of Regulation Under Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
Government regulations, like the HACCP promulgated by the
USDA, have been subject to judicial scrutiny. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court set
forth a two-pronged test to determine whether the regulations

Health, Safety and Welfare?, 21 W. ST. U. L. REv. 563, 563 (1994).
52 Supreme Beef 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
53 Id.

54 See Michael, supra note 6, at 569-70.
15Id. at 568-69.
56 Id. at 569.

57 DeWaal, supra note 7, at 332.
58 id.

59 USDA Hazard Analysis and HACCP Plan, 9 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2003). See
also DeWaal, supra note 7, at 332.
6 DeWaal, supra note 7, at 332-33.
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61
outlined by a federal agency are within that agency's authority.
First, the court looks to the plain language of the legislation to
determine whether the construction of the regulations conflicts
directly with the statute. 62 Second, if the construction is not in
conflict, deference is due to the agency's regulations. 63 This section
will consider a recent application of the Chevron test to the USDA's
HACCP program and the possible ramifications of that decision for
federal food safety enforcement.

III. The Supreme Beef Case
In Supreme Beef Processors,Inc. v. United States Department
of Agriculture, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that the USDA's implementation of Salmonella
control guidelines was beyond the limits of the USDA's
congressional mandate for food safety.6 4 Supreme Beef Processors,
Inc. ("SuNpreme Beef") implemented protocols under the HACCP
program. To evaluate the success of Supreme Beef's protocols, the
FSIS tested the level of Salmonella bacteria in samples of Supreme
Beef's finished product. 66 The FSIS used Salmonella as an "indicator
organism," a plant's failure to control the levels of Salmonella in its
67
product was considered a failure to control food-borne pathogens.
The FSIS developed a three-step procedure to determine whether a
plant was meeting the established standards. 68 First, the FSIS would
take samples from the plant for 53 consecutive days. 69 If more than
five of these samples tested positive for Salmonella, FSIS would
notify the plant of its need to take immediate action to correct the

61

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843

(1984).
62

Id. at 843-44.

63

Id.; see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S.

407 (1992) (applying the Chevron test).
64 Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (N.D.
Tex.2000).
65 Id. at 1050.

66

Id. at 1049.

67

Id. at 1049-50.

6' Id. at 1050.
69

id.
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failure. 70 Following a second round of tests, if more than five samples
tested positive, the plant would be required to reevaluate its protocols
and "take appropriate corrective action.,, 71 Failing a third round of
tests constitutes a "failure to maintain sanitary conditions and failure
to maintain an adequate HAACP [sic] plan,",72 causing FSIS to
suspend its inspections. 73 Such action causes an immediate shutdown
of the plant, because any product that is produced without inspection
is considered adulterated and cannot be sold.7 4
Following Supreme Beef's implementation of a HACCP plan,
the USDA began testing for Salmonella in Supreme Beef's finished
product on November 2, 1998. 75 By the end of the first round of tests,
47 percent of the samples that the USDA examined had tested
positive for Salmonella. 76 A second round of tests found 20.8 percent
contamination.77 Following five weeks of a third round of testing,
The USDA notified Supreme Beef that it would fail the third round of
tests and that the USDA intended to withdraw its inspectors.78 On the
day that the USDA was to remove the inspectors, Supreme Beef filed
suit in the United States District Court.7 9
A. Supreme Beef Before the District Court
Before the Texas District Court, Supreme Beef argued that the
Salmonella tests that the USDA required were not within the
department's authority under the FMIA. 80 The court granted a
temporary restraining order and eventually a preliminary injunction
Supreme Beef 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
71 Id.; FSIS contamination with microorganisms; process control verification
70

criteria and testing; pathogen reduction standards, 9 C.F.R. § 310.25(b)(3)(ii)

(2003).
72

Supreme Beef 1,113 F.Supp. 2d at 1050; 9 C.F.R. § 310.25(b)(3)(iii).

Supreme Beef 1,113 F.Supp. 2d at 1050.
74 Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 604 (1994); see also Merrill &
13

Francer, supra note 1, at 100.
75 Supreme Beef 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
76

Id.

77 Id.
78 Id. at 1051.
79 id.
80

id.
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in favor of Supreme Beef, preventing the USDA from withdrawing
its inspectors from the Supreme Beef plant. 8' The court subsequently
granted Supreme Beef's motion for summary judgment. 82
While noting that federal administrative agencies are given
substantial discretion in creating regulations, 83 the district court held
that the USDA was not working within the statute that authorized it
to evaluate the conditions of a meatpacking plant. 84 Specifically, the
court noted that the statute only allows the USDA to determine that
meat is adulterated when the processor's factory is found to be
unsanitary. 85 At the Supreme Beef plant the USDA had relied on tests
of the packer's final product,
86 which the court held was different from
testing factory conditions.
B. Supreme Beef Before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the USDA relied on the
language of the FMIA defining the word "adulterated,", 8 7 arguing that
it has the authority to regulate Salmonella levels in shipments of meat
that meat processors receive. 88 The Fifth Circuit, applying the
Chevron test, found that the USDA's construction of the word
"adulterated" did not conform to the statutory definition of
"adulterated" under Section 601(m)(4) of the FMIA and affirmed the
trial court's decision. 89 As a result, the Fifth Circuit held that the
USDA's construction conflicted with the plain meaning of the statute
and thus violated the Chevron test
90 because of the USDA's invalid
exercise of rulemaking authority.
The FMIA provides that, for a product to be found

81 Supreme BeefI, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.

82

Id. at 1055.

83

Id. at 1054.

84

Id. at 1053.

85 id.
86 id.
87

Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2001).

See also Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (1994) (definition of
"adulterated").
88

Supreme Beef l,275 F.3d at 441 n.33.

89

Id. at 443; 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4).

90 Supreme Beef l,275 F.3d at 443.

2004]

Rethinking FederalFood Safety Regulation

adulterated, it must be "prepared, packed or held under unsanitary
conditions.. .whereby it may have been rendered injurious to
health." 9' The court focused on the use of the word "rendered,"
finding that the statute requires that a harmful change must have
occurred in the meat while it was being "prepared, packed, or held"
in the plant. 92 Because Salmonella is initially present in many meat
and poultry products, even before they are sent to a packing plant in
the first place, 93 the court ruled that Salmonella contamination itself
94
is not actually occurring while it is "prepared, packed, or held., 95
Rather, it occurs before the meat even reaches the meatpacker.
Thus, the court found, Congress did not authorize the USDA to
regulate Salmonella, a pathogen that may already 96be on the meat
when it is initially received by a meat packing plant.
Supreme Beef left policy makers concerned. In response to the
Fifth Circuit's decision, Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa introduced
legislation to ensure the power of the USDA to regulate meat
safety.97 Dan Glickman, the Secretary of Agriculture during the
Clinton administration, said that Supreme Beef highlighted "a serious
gap in the law... [n]ow it is up to Congress to correct it and see it as a

matter of high priority for public health.

98

IV. Analysis
Despite legislative measures, the Fifth Circuit correctly
applied existing regulation construction precedent in holding that the
USDA overstepped its statutory authority. This is not to suggest that
the decision in Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. United States
Department of Agriculture is beneficial for the American consumer.
In fact, while Supreme Beef ruled out Salmonella testing as a

91Id. at 440 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (emphasis added by the court)).
92

Supreme Beef H,275 F.3d at 440.

" Id. at 438.

94 Id. at 440.
95 Id.
96

Id.

97 S. 2760, 106th Cong. (2000) (unenacted); 146 CONG. REc. S5556 (daily ed.

June 21, 2000) (statement of Sen. Harkin). See also Elizabeth Becker, Government
in Showdown in Bid to Shut Beef Processor,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at A16.

98 Becker, supra note 97, at A16.
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verification procedure for the HACCP program, 99 it may have been
the wake-up call that American food safety policy needed.
The essence of the Chevron analysis is that a regulation
adopted by a regulatory body must find some basis in the statute that
gives that body its authority. 00 But what is a government agency to
do when faced with a statute that does not clearly give it power? The
USDA did what it could given the circumstances; it promulgated a
plan designed to protect the consumer, while allowing the
meatpacking industry to have a hand in the regulations to which it
was subject. 10 Surely, this is what Congress wanted the USDA to do
when it authorized the department to take charge of meat and poultry
safety in the United States. Of course, given that there was no
specific mandate from Congress, the meatpacking industry was free
to backpedal and claim that the regulations it originally submitted to
were unfair.
In fact, the USDA argued that it was acting within its
authority when it construed the definition of "adulterated" under the
FMIA. 1° 2 The argument is structured like this: the USDA must
prevent meat from being "prepared, packed, or held under unsanitary
conditions."' 103 In an amicus curiae brief, consumer groups argued
that, under the FMIA, the USDA is required to prevent plants from
accepting "excessively contaminated meat" and thus allow otherwise
pathogen-free meat from becoming contaminated by pathogens from
other meat and preparation surfaces on which contaminated meat is
processed.104 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the
Salmonella tests only took place at the end of the production process,
not at the beginning.' 0 5 As a result, there was no baseline against
which to determine whether
meat was being contaminated during the
06
process.'
production
Federal law regarding the regulation of food-borne pathogens

99 Supreme Beef I, 275 F.3d at 440.
11XId.
10

See DeWaal, supra note 7, at 332.

'02 Amicus Brief for Appellant at 6, Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA,
275 F.3d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-11008).
103 See 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (2003).

'04

Amicus Brief for Appellant at 6, Supreme Beef l (No. 00-11008).

105 Supreme Beef H, 275 F.3d at 442.
106

id.
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are not always as specific as they could be. 10 7 Even members of
Congress have expressed concern that the court's finding in Supreme
Beef prevents the USDA from acting appropriately. 10 8 If any good is
to come from the case, it will be from the recognition of Congress
that current statutory authorization for USDA food safety regulations
is either too weak or too vague and that Section 601(m)(4) of the
FMIA needs to be amended to address the problem.

V.

Impact of Supreme Beef

The meat on America's dinner tables is probably not tangibly
less safe because of Supreme Beef. However, there is still cause for
concern. Today, there is still no specific congressional mandate for
the USDA to have pathogen standards, only the general statutory
language that the Texas District Court and Fifth Circuit held
insufficient. 0 9 Worse, there are signs that the meat packingt° industry
may have been emboldened by the ruling in Supreme Beef.'
The HACCP was designed to allow the meatpacking industry
to regulate itself with some governmental oversight." However, this
system is futile if government oversight through frequent inspection
and laboratory testing is not available to the USDA." 2 At worst,
without some verification system at the back end of the HACCP,
meatpackers are free to claim that they are doing their job just by
107

See generally FSIS Post-Mortem Inspection, 9 C.F.R.

§ 310 (2003);

USDA Hazard Analysis and HACCP Plan, 9 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2003).
108 149 CONG. REC. S6981 (daily ed. May 22, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Harkin).
'09 See Allison Beers, USDA shows little interest in expanded powers, FOOD

NEWS, Mar. 18, 2002, Vol. 44, Issue 5, at 15 (quoting congressional
testimony by USDA Undersecretary for Food Safety Elsa Murano, who suggested
the USDA is not interested in seeking further congressional authority), available at
2002 WL 11878873.
CHEMICAL

110 See generally Mark Kawar, 'Restated' Regulations Keep Beef Plant Open,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,

Jan. 28, 2003, at 1D. See also Peterson & Drew, supra

note 8, at Al.
...Michael, supra note 6, at 569.
112Merrill & Francer, supra note 1, at 131 (suggesting that HACCP without
rigorous oversight is "little more than an industry honor system"). See also Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Restructuring and the
Districtof Columbia, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 96,

104 (1999) (statement of Caroline Smith DeWaal, Director, Food Safety Program,
Center for Science in the Public Interest).
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monitoring the critical points they have found in their factories, even
if contaminated meat is still working its way through their system.
A. Post Supreme Beef: Nebraska Beef, Ltd. v. United States
Department of Agriculture
Along with Supreme Beef, another case has raised concern
about the USDA's ability to enforce its food safety regulations. In
Nebraska Beef Ltd. v. United States Department of Agriculture,
Nebraska Beef, Ltd. ("Nebraska Beef') sought and won a restraining
order preventing the USDA from withdrawing its inspectors from a
Nebraska Beef plant. 113 Nebraska Beef had argued that the economic
difficulties that surround a shutdown outweighed the "accusations
and authority" cited by the USDA. 114 United States District Court
Judge Joseph Bataillon said that if he did not issue the temporary
restraining order, the subsequent economic harm to Nebraska Beef
would be "far greater than any injury" to the USDA." 5 Following the
restraining order, the USDA settled with Nebraska Beef and
implemented a "restatement" of USDA regulations at the Nebraska
Beef plant in question. 116 The restatement required Nebraska Beef to
appoint a full time employee to oversee food safety regulation
implementation, educate employees about food safety, hire an
independent third party to audit food safety protocols in the plant, and
periodically report back to the USDA. 17 The USDA's actions
elicited an immediate response from consumer groups who feared
that Nebraska Beef's settlement could be replicated by other
companies who would be
11 8 emboldened by the Supreme Beef and
Nebraska Beef successes.
More than a month after the settlement, Department of
Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman defended the Nebraska Beef
settlement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
113
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Agriculture, stating that the settlement gave the Department of
Agriculture more control within the plant. 9 Veneman also told the
committee that the USDA would not be reluctant to withdraw
inspectors from unsanitary plants. 120 Even so, the "most important
tool' 12 1 of the USDA had been thwarted by a restraining order from a
federal 1judge in the very case Veneman was discussing at the
hearing.
In response to a subsequent Nebraska Beef lawsuit against the
USDA, Carol Tucker Foreman, director of the Food Policy
Institute, 123 suggested that such lawsuits indicate a new pattern of
litigation by meatpackers. 124 According to Foreman, "[t]hey're trying
to send a message to the USDA that some people125will fight them
every step of the way if they try to enforce the law."'
B. Potential Food Safety Legislation
Recently, citing the Supreme Beef and Nebraska Beef cases,
Senator Harkin reintroduced legislation designed to broaden the
USDA's powers, specifically granting it authority to enforce foodborne pathogen standards and to enforce HACCP plans. 126 Senator
Harkin sees Supreme Beef and Nebraska Beef as indications that
"today, there is nothing USDA could do to shut down a meat
grinding plant that insists
on using low-quality, potentially
'1 27
trimmings."
contaminated
Legislation specifically authorizing the Department of
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Agriculture to enforce its pathogen standards and the HACCP
protocols is critical. The behavior of meat packing plants like
Supreme Beef and Nebraska Beef is not isolated.128 Indeed, there is
evidence that HACCP is not working as well as it should. 129 For
example, since the implementation of a HACCP system at the
Shapiro Packing plant in Augusta, Georgia, federal inspectors have
repeatedly discovered meat tainted with fecal matter.' 30 Worse,
inspectors also found a shipment of hamburger from the plant to be
infected with E. coli, but were able to intervene in time to prevent its
shipment to public schools.' 3 1 Nevertheless, the USDA 32delayed
action and did nothing more than threaten to close the plant.'

VI. Conclusion
The Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Supreme Beef more than
two years ago.' 3 3 In the interim, there has been no significant action
on the part of the federal government to redouble its food safety
efforts, save some proposed legislation. If commentators, looking at
cases like Supreme Beef and Nebraska Beef, are correct in finding a
movement by meat packers toward more litigation in an attempt to
lessen government regulatory interest, consumers may be in danger.
It would appear that meat packing associations and their contingent
interest groups are willing to fight against regulation designed to
protect the public. Under Supreme Beef those interests may be
protected only because of Congress' failure to act, which can only
continue to be detrimental to the consumer.
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